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Partnership and Tension: The Army and Air Force Between Vietnam and
Desert Shield
HAROLD R. WINTON

From Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 100-19. .
The field of classical music, which requires the harmonious blending of sounds produced by a wide variety of talented
artists, has provided military historians and practitioners a rich trove of analogies for the description of battles and
campaigns. It can, however, likewise be used to examine the interaction of two armed services in times of peace. It is
thus perhaps fitting to consider the thoughts of George Szell, renowned conductor of the Cleveland orchestra, who
opined that
the characteristics commonly associated with chamber music can be achieved in symphonic orchestras far
more readily than is customarily imagined. It is a matter, first, of the excellence of the players themselves,
and second of the manner in which they are trained to listen to what others are doing and to make their
individual part contribute to the ensemble synthesis.[1]
This article will examine the extent to which Army and Air Force cooperation on air-ground issues met maestro Szell's
standards in the years between the end of the war in Vietnam and the eve of Desert Shield.
The heart of the work is a critical, comparative analysis of Army and Air Force doctrine regarding air-ground
operations in the period 1973-1990. For purposes of the analysis, air-ground operations are defined as attacks from the
air against enemy ground targets that have either tactical or operational consequence for friendly ground formations.
Such attacks are usually classified under the rubrics of close air support (CAS) and air interdiction (AI). The purpose
of the analysis is to determine the degrees of commonality and divergence that marked the two services' approaches to
air-ground operations and the underlying reasons for either the compatibility or tension between the emerging doctrinal
positions. Initial factors to be examined include the services' visions of the nature of war, their doctrine development
processes, and the roles of key Army and Air Force personalities in shaping doctrine.
The article is divided into three parts. The first focuses on the period from 1973 to 1979 when the Army and the Air
Force began a partnership that was based primarily on the Army's realization of its need for Air Force support to
execute its Active Defense doctrine. The second examines the period from 1980 to 1986, in which the partnership was
strengthened as the Army transitioned from a doctrine of Active Defense to AirLand Battle and began to grapple with
the concept of the operational level of war. The final section assesses the years from 1987 to 1990 in light of the
Army's efforts to develop capabilities to conduct deep battle and the emergence of unofficial thought within the Air
Force concerning the operational level of war.
Forming the Partnership, 1973-1979
The Vietnam experience significantly affected both the Army and the Air Force, but in noticeably different ways. The
Army was virtually shattered. The proud, confident days when troops had helicoptered into the Ia Drang Valley and
put to flight multiple NVA regiments were, by 1973, a faded and distant memory. Instead, at the forefront of the
Army's consciousness were a series of battles that were, at best, tactical stalemates, and a deep malaise brought about
by an unpopular war, an inequitable draft system, a progressive unraveling of small-unit discipline, and a severe
questioning of the competence and integrity of its senior leaders. While some placed the onus for the Vietnam debacle
on misguided policy and faulty military strategy directed from the E-ring of the Pentagon, others realized that if the
Army was to provide effectively for the common defense, it would have to reform itself both morally and
intellectually. The intellectual component of that transformation was to be centered first in doctrine.

The Air Force experience in Vietnam was not as searing as the Army's, but it did possess some doctrinal implications.
First, the evidence on air interdiction was mixed. While it had not been able to alter appreciably the support to guerrilla
warfare, it had demonstrated the ability to disrupt substantially the logistical flow to conventional offensive operations.
Second, seven long years operating under a badly fragmented command system strongly reinforced the Air Force's
institutional preference for a single air commander in each theater of operations, operating under the direct purview of
the theater commander. The implications of the Vietnam experience for the theory of strategic attack to negate an
opponent's military capability and undermine his political will were less clear. Many Air Force analysts insisted that
Linebacker II demonstrated what airpower could do when the politicians took the gloves off.[2] More thoughtful
analysts, however, pointed out that there was no specific target set that neutralized the DRVN military capability and
that Nixon's political objective of disengaging America from Vietnam was purchased with the carrot of concessions as
much as it was imposed with the stick of airpower.[3] Vietnam provided rather uncertain grist for the Air Force
doctrinal mill.
Army-Air Force communications on doctrinal matters were also influenced by the differing command echelons at
which each service's most significant doctrine was developed. The Air Force doctrinal structure envisioned three
levels: basic, or fundamental, doctrine, which is normally written at the Air Staff; operational doctrine, which is the
responsibility of the major subordinate commands; and tactical doctrine, which is developed by a variety of schools
and agencies.[4] The structure of Army doctrine is similar, but more closely tied to its level of organization. At the top
is capstone doctrine, which is the rough equivalent of Air Force basic doctrine. Subordinate doctrine addresses
warfighting and support concepts appropriate to corps, division, brigades, battalions, and ultimately even minor tactical
units.
The major difference between the Army and the Air Force after 1973 was that the Army formed in that year a single
organization, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which was responsible for the development of virtually
all its doctrine from the capstone manual to the lowest tactical publication. This gave the Army a powerful integrating
agency that could, and did, make doctrine the engine that drove the Army. Perhaps doctrinal development in the Air
Force was more diffuse because doctrine was a more tangential concern in Air Force than in Army life. This diffusion
also created real problems in institutional communication. Both the Air Force and the Army recognized that the USAF
Tactical Air Command (TAC), to which belonged all the continental US-based aircraft that flew CAS and interdiction
missions, was the logical point of contact at which TRADOC should interact on doctrinal matters. But the TACTRADOC dialogue was always influenced by the fact that TAC did not speak for the Air Force--the Air Staff closely
guarded its prerogatives in doctrinal matters.[5] Given the distinctly divergent institutional arrangements for doctrinal
formulation, it is surprising that one actually finds a significant amount of cooperation between the two services during
the era between Vietnam and Desert Shield. That story begins with the development of the Army's "Active Defense"
doctrine published in 1976.
The 1976 edition of Field Manual 100-5 was driven by three dynamics: the reorientation of the American national
security focus from Indochina to Europe; the increased range, accuracy, and lethality of direct-fire weapons evident in
the 1973 Middle East War; and the personal energy and determination of TRADOC's first commander, General
William E. DePuy. The situation in Europe was grim. Army forces there had been bled white to support the insatiable
manpower appetite of the war in Vietnam, and the continuously modernized Warsaw Pact forces appeared capable of
launching a successful offensive into NATO territory. The 1973 Middle East War served as a wake-up call for the US
Army. Tank and artillery losses from both sides were greater than the complete inventory of these systems in US
Army, Europe.[6] General DePuy supplied the energy to apply the lessons that he derived from the Arab-Israeli War to
the fashioning of an American Army that would be tactically capable of repelling a Warsaw Pact invasion in
Europe.[7]
The centerpiece of this transformation was the 1976 edition of Field Manual 100-5. The second paragraph of the
opening chapter contained the clear imperative, "Today the US Army must, above all else, prepare to win the first
battle of the next war" (emphasis in original).[8] The entire second chapter was a discourse on the effects of modern
weapons that graphically depicted their increased range and lethality from World War II to the 1973 Middle East War.
Of particular interest to the present study was Chapter 8, "Air-Land Battle," the second paragraph of which explicitly
addressed the Army's dependence upon the Air Force:

Both the Army and the Air Force deliver firepower against the enemy. Both can kill a tank. Both can
collect intelligence, conduct reconnaissance, provide air defense, move troops and supplies, and jam radios
and radar. But neither the Army nor the Air Force can fulfill any one of those functions completely by
itself. Thus, the Army cannot win the land battle without the Air Force [emphasis in original].[9]
This analysis paid particular attention to the suppression of Warsaw Pact air defenses, asserting, "Whenever and
wherever the heavy use of airpower is needed to win the air-land battle, the enemy air defenses must be suppressed"
(emphasis in original).[10] This suppression was depicted as a joint effort that required the integration of the
intelligence and strike capabilities of both services. In short, the Army's 1976 doctrinal prescription for a future war in
Europe clearly recognized that cooperation with the Air Force was a tactical and institutional imperative.
Air Force basic doctrine in the period 1973-1979 does not reflect a similar sense of commonality. The 1975 edition of
Air Force Manual 1-1 was a bland document. The manual listed eight combat operational missions that included
strategic attack, counter air, air interdiction, close air support, aerospace defense of the United States, aerospace
surveillance and reconnaissance, airlift, and special operations.[11] It also provided the stock definitions of and
commentary on AI and CAS operations. The former were defined as those "conducted to destroy, neutralize or delay
enemy ground or naval forces before they can be brought to bear against friendly forces." CAS operations were
"intended to provide responsive, sustained and concentrated firepower of great lethality and precision . . . in close
integration with the fire and maneuver of surface forces." There was, however, nothing in the 1975 edition of AFM 1-1
to indicate that the conditions under which AI and CAS were to be executed had recently undergone radical
transformation or that close cooperation with the Army, particularly in the area of the suppression of enemy air
defenses (SEAD), had become a key element in the Air Force's ability to conduct these operations without suffering
unacceptable losses.
The 1979 edition of AFM 1-1 did little, if anything, to improve this situation. Now widely derided by airpower
cognoscenti, this manual has been referred to by one informed analyst as representing "the nadir of Air Force
doctrine."[12] The manual appeared to meet the objective stated by its original drafters three years earlier to "provide a
document that is interesting, relevant, and useful at all Air Force organizational levels."[13] However, in attempting to
be all things to all people, the manual also appeared to lose its focus.
Despite the fuzziness of Air Force basic doctrine, there is considerable evidence to indicate that the Air Force was
closely scrutinizing the realities of a possible war in Europe and was actively cooperating with the Army to reach
mutually acceptable solutions to those problems. The former was manifested in the decision to develop a singlemission CAS aircraft and in a series of studies that examined the details of a possible Warsaw Pact invasion of
Western Europe. The latter was demonstrated in numerous joint ventures between TAC and TRADOC.
The development of the A-10 ground attack aircraft was the most tangible and, in many ways, the most significant
indicator of the Air Force's commitment to air-ground operations between Vietnam and Desert Shield. The key
problem was how to kill tanks with air-delivered munitions. The answer that emerged was an aircraft designed around
a Gatling gun that fired 3000 to 4000 rounds of armor-piercing ammunition per minute.[14] From the Army's point of
view, production and fielding of the A-10 not only vouchsafed the Air Force's commitment to the CAS mission, it also
created a corpus of pilots whose whole professional being was centered around providing that support.
The Air Force's analytical focus began to shift toward the problems of a European war in the mid-1970s. In late 1975,
RAND completed a study for the Air Force that examined the relative merits of additional manned aircraft, remotely
piloted vehicles, and stand-off munitions for improving air-ground capability in NATO.[15] In May 1976, the Air
Force sponsored a two-day conference at RAND to explore in some detail exactly how the Warsaw Pact ground forces
might attack NATO.[16] Among the issues addressed were how the war might start, principal attack axes, the primacy
of the offensive in Soviet doctrine, Soviet concepts and tactics, logistical support, air defenses, and chemical warfare
capabilities. Other RAND studies requested by the Air Force included a 1978 analysis of the effects of weather on
battlefield air support in NATO and a 1979 assessment of the potential vulnerabilities of Warsaw Pact forces to attacks
against their tactical rear areas.[17] The main conclusion one draws from these analyses is that in the early postVietnam years, the Air Force took its mission to support the Army in a European war very seriously indeed and
engaged in a comprehensive effort to determine how best to accomplish this mission.

The most obvious institutional arrangement that reflected Army-Air Force cooperation was the connection between
TRADOC and TAC. Initial meetings between the commands were held in October 1973; on 1 July 1975, they
established a joint office known as the Directorate of Air-Land Forces Application, or ALFA.[18] ALFA's location at
Langley AFB, Virginia, TAC's headquarters and a mere 15-minute drive from TRADOC's headquarters at Fort
Monroe, facilitated communication.
During the period 1975-1979, ALFA successfully resolved many of the tactical and procedural issues regarding airground interface on a highly lethal battlefield. Airspace management was addressed in a document issued by
TRADOC, TAC, and FORSCOM (US Army Forces Command) that was successfully tested in the 1976 Reforger
(Return of Forces to Germany) exercise.[19] The agency also produced a comprehensive volume on the Soviet air
defense threat and a study of this system's vulnerabilities.[20] In September 1977, tests under ALFA's aegis were
conducted at Fort Benning, Georgia, to evaluate techniques for the combined use of attack helicopters and A-10
aircraft against enemy ground formations.
At higher levels, however, ALFA was not able to bridge the gap between Army and Air Force views on air-ground
cooperation. The genesis of the problem was General Creighton Abrams's 1973 decision to eliminate the field army as
an echelon of army organization.[21] The demobilization of the Army and the elimination of the peacetime draft at the
end of the Vietnam War led to a precipitous reduction in Army manpower. In order to satisfy Congress with an
acceptable "tooth-to-tail" ratio and stabilize the Army's force structure, Abrams struck an agreement with Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger to retain 16 divisions on active duty in return for a guaranteed force of roughly 785,000. To
hold up his end of the bargain, Abrams had to do two things: first, put a major portion of the support structure into the
reserves; and second, cut manpower at command levels above the division. Thus, the field army as an organizational
echelon disappeared.
The field army headquarters, however, had been the nexus of air-ground cooperation in both World War II and Korea.
The fundamental precept that emerged from this relationship was that each field army would be supported by a
collocated Tactical Air Command that worked for the theater air commander but whose raison d'être was assisting the
supported ground commander in the accomplishment of his mission. A series of proposals involving the exchange of
liaison elements between the two services culminated in a test of the concept late in 1977. In January 1978 TRADOC
published its analysis of exercise Blue Flag, which concluded that there was adequate Air Force representation at the
corps level and that the Army had adequate representation to the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC).[22] There was,
however, an anomaly in this report. It envisioned individual corps commanders communicating directly with the air
component commander regarding the redistribution of sorties among the corps, which was clearly not a position the
Air Force relished.[23] The demise of the field army would continue to bedevil Army and Air Force planners in the
years ahead.
In summary, the early post-Vietnam years were marked by a deliberate effort on the part of the Army and the Air
Force to prepare themselves to defend Western Europe. The Army's effort was driven by the creation of TRADOC and
the conscious use of doctrine as the device to refashion itself in the wake of the Vietnam trauma. In contrast, Air Force
basic doctrine appeared to lack a unifying vision. Nevertheless, the Air Force developed an aircraft tailor-made for
killing enemy tanks in Europe and it carefully assayed both the Warsaw Pact ground forces and the physical
environment in which it would have to operate to help the Army defeat them. Finally, a promising start at forging
cooperation between the two services was embodied in the TAC-TRADOC partnership. There remained, however, the
troubling issue of restoring the higher-level ground-air interface in the wake of the Army's decision to eliminate the
field army as an organizational echelon.
Strengthening the Partnership, 1980-1986
Over the next six years, the Army significantly revised its capstone doctrine from Active Defense to AirLand Battle.
The latter term generated a great deal of misunderstanding, particularly during the Gulf War. It is important to
remember that AirLand Battle was Army doctrine; it was not Air Force doctrine, and it was not joint doctrine. Air
Force basic doctrine was rearticulated in 1984, providing a somewhat more coherent view of the theory and application
of airpower than had its predecessors. Air Force cooperation was absolutely essential to the execution of the Army's
AirLand Battle doctrine. That cooperation was evident in the development of the "31 Initiatives," which focused

mainly on programmatic activities between the Army and Air Staffs, and ALFA's publication of several practical
biservice manuals. However, the tension between Army and Air Force perspectives regarding air-ground integration at
the operational level again surfaced, this time in the extent to which NATO doctrinal prescriptions for the control of
air interdiction would be incorporated into American Air Force practice.
General DePuy had clearly intended for the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 to be widely read. It was. It was also widely
debated. As the debate matured, criticism of the Active Defense became focused on several key issues. First, it was too
weapon-system oriented; soldiers were portrayed as mere operators, not warriors. Second, the defensive method of
moving from blocking position to blocking position seemed to cede the initiative to the adversary. Third, the emphasis
placed on winning the first battle left open the more important question of winning the last battle. Additionally, the
doctrine's focus at division level and below omitted the important contribution to be made by the corps, particularly in
disrupting Soviet second-echelon forces. Although this debate was in part prompted and abetted by outside analysts, it
was largely an internal affair.[24] Army officers read DePuy's manual closely; and the more they read it, the less they
liked it.[25]
This dissatisfaction in the ranks corresponded with two developments at the top. On 1 July 1977, General Donn A.
Starry replaced General DePuy as TRADOC commander; and in June 1979 the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Chief of Staff-designate, Lieutenant General Edward C. Meyer, suggested to Starry that it was time to
begin work on a new FM 100-5.[26] Starry was already inclined in this direction.[27] Although as commander of the
Armor Center, and a DePuy protégé, he had been one of the key participants in developing the 1976 edition of FM
100-5, his perspective began to change when he took command of the V Corps in Europe.[28] Here he realized the
vital importance of not simply blunting the initial attack, but of engaging Soviet second-echelon forces as well.[29]
After a period of casting around for a term that would adequately convey the sense of the doctrinal shift he envisioned,
Starry announced his decision to refer to the Army's approach to warfare as "AirLand Battle."[30] There are two things
noteworthy about this decision. First, although the doctrine espoused in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 came to be
known as "Active Defense," that was a derived name, not a given one. In contrast, Starry deliberately hung a label on
his emerging doctrine. Second, the "Air" part of AirLand Battle was clearly intended to signal the Air Force that the
Army envisioned a strong partnership between the two services on any future battlefield.[31]
The 1982 edition of FM 100-5 reflected both Starry's guidance and the input of a number of mid-grade officers who
had found the previous edition badly wanting.[32] The new manual addressed virtually all of the concerns raised by
the latter. Gone was the single focus on the first battle. Instead, the manual introduced the concept of an operational
level of war that involved the planning and conduct of campaigns, defined as "sustained operations designed to defeat
an enemy force in a specified space and time with simultaneous and sequential battles" (emphasis added).[33] The
new doctrine espoused four "basic tenets" of initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization (emphasis in original).[34]
The tenet of depth led to the concept of "deep battle," which was particularly significant for air-ground operations, for
it articulated the Army's realization of the need to delay or disrupt--to interdict--Soviet second-echelon formations
before they made contact with friendly troops.
In 1986 the Army published a new edition of FM 100-5, which updated and expanded the concept of AirLand
Battle.[35] This edition contained much more explicit attention to the conduct of campaigns and major operations. Of
particular note for the conduct of air-ground operations was this statement:
Operational level commanders try to set favorable terms for battle by synchronized ground, air, and sea
maneuver and by striking the enemy throughout the theater of operations. Large scale ground maneuver
will always require protection from enemy air forces and sometimes from naval forces. Commanders will
therefore conduct reconnaissance, interdiction, air defense, and special operations almost continuously. Air
interdiction, air and ground reconnaissance . . . must all be synchronized to support the overall campaign
and its supporting operations on the ground, especially at critical junctures.[36]
This passage reflected a growing maturity on the part of Army doctrine writers, for it specifically referred to ground
operations supporting an overall campaign plan. While it established the need for ground forces to receive air
protection and for the synchronization of interdiction with them, especially at critical junctures, this doctrinal statement
implicitly accepted the proposition that the critical decisions on how the synchronization would take place would be

made in the context of campaign objectives, not merely the tactical dictates of individual battles. This realization
brought it much more closely into tune with the Air Force perspective on the employment of airpower.
That perspective was formally updated in the 1984 edition of AFM 1-1, now titled Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the
United States Air Force.[37] It was divided into four chapters, dealing with the military instrument of power; the
employment of aerospace forces; missions and specialized tasks; and issues of organization, training, equipment, and
sustainment. The discussion of the coordination of interdiction activities with surface forces was particularly apt:
The effect of these attacks is profound when the enemy is engaged in a highly mobile maneuver scheme of
operation dependent on urgent resupply of combat reserves and consumables. Air and surface commanders
should take actions to force the enemy into this intense form of combat with a systematic and persistent
plan of attack. The purpose is . . . to generate situations where friendly surface forces can then take
advantage of forecast enemy reactions.[38]
In sum, the Air Force's 1984 statement of its basic doctrine represented a more coherent explication of airpower
principles than its predecessor and recognized some of the potential for the cooperation of air and ground forces at the
operational level, but stopped short of a fully developed typology of how this synergism could best be achieved.
The partnership between Tactical Air Command and TRADOC was strengthened by a formal understanding at the
departmental level "for enhancement of joint employment of the AirLand Battle Doctrine."[39] This April 1983
document, signed by the service Chiefs of Staff, committed the services to use the 1982 edition of FM 100-5 as the
basis for seeking increased integration of Army and Air Force tactical forces, enhancing interservice planning and
programming, continuing the dialogue on doctrinal matters, working together on deep-attack systems, coordinating
airlift requirements, and resolving issues concerning the integration of AirLand Battle into theater operations. It was
followed in November 1983 by an understanding signed by the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Charles A. Gabriel,
and the new Army Chief of Staff, General John A. Wickham. This paper emphasized the planning and programmatic
aspects of the previous memo and pledged the services to "initiate herewith a joint process to develop in a deliberate
manner the most combat effective, affordable joint forces necessary for airland combat operations."[40] This
agreement committed the services to exploring 31 specific initiatives regarding air-ground operations that dealt with
issues of air defense, rear area operations, suppression of enemy air defenses, special operations forces, munitions
development, combat techniques and procedures, and the fusion of combat information.[41]
The "31 Initiatives" achieved mixed success. Within 15 months, action on 18 of them had been completed, including
the Air Force's decision to cancel the development of a "mobile weapons system" (an ersatz tank) for airbase defense
and a ground-based radar jamming system; concomitant cancellation of an Army program for an airborne radar
jammer; joint development of a tactical missile system (J-TACMS) and a surveillance target and attack radar system
(J-STARS); and agreement between TAC and TRADOC regarding procedures for CAS in the rear areas.[42] The
services continued to find it difficult, however, to settle the issue of air-ground interface at the operational level of war.
The focal point for this obstacle was the divergence of perspectives over Initiative #21, battlefield air interdiction
(BAI). BAI had a long and checkered past that arose from three issues: first, the divergence between the Army and the
Air Force concerning the relative authority of various command echelons in directing aircraft to provide ground
support; second, the elimination of the field army as a ground echelon of command; and third, the influence of NATO
tactical air doctrine on US Air Force doctrine. The Air Force command philosophy, expressed most recently in the
1984 edition of AFM 1-1 was one of "centralize control-decentralize execution."[43] Although the doctrine did not
spell out the level of centralization, the Air Force preference was for control at the theater of operations. This meant,
from the Air Force perspective, that the theater air commander would retain responsibility for control and direction of
the air interdiction effort, while ground commanders supported by various air formations would have a voice only in
the sub-allocation of CAS sorties to their subordinate units. As we have seen, however, the structure of the air-ground
interface process was now in a state of disarray brought about by the disappearance of the field army.
The problem was further complicated by the military command structure in Allied Command Europe's Central Region,
AFCENT, and divergences between British and American philosophies of air-ground operations. AFCENT was
organized with a theater headquarters, a supporting air headquarters known as Allied Air Forces Central Europe

(AAFCE), which contained the 2d and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces (2ATAF and 4ATAF), and two subordinate land
headquarters, Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) and Central Army Group (CENTAG). Although 2ATAF and
4ATAF were subordinate to AAFCE, they were also responsible for providing air support to NORTHAG and
CENTAG respectively. And, although both ATAFs and both Army Groups were truly allied formations, 2ATAF and
NORTHAG were dominated by the British, while 4ATAF and CENTAG were dominated by the Americans.
Furthermore, the British and Americans had distinctly different perspectives on air-ground operations.[44] Based on
philosophy, economics, and aircraft capabilities, the Royal Air Force preferred to generate a large number of sorties in
small, two-plane formations with relatively little centralized control. It also preferred relatively shallow interdiction to
deep interdiction. The USAF, on the other hand, preferred a slightly more "above the fray" approach that emphasized a
fewer number of larger formations under relatively tight centralized control. And, based on its possession of platforms
that could conduct deep interdiction and its concern for the high density of air defense weapons arrayed at and
immediately behind the front lines of Soviet forces, it preferred deep to shallow interdiction.
A compromise was worked out in NATO tactical air doctrine that provided for both relatively deep air interdiction (AI)
and relatively shallow battlefield air interdiction (BAI).[45] More significantly, this doctrine also provided that BAI
and CAS would be joined together in a category known as offensive air support (OAS).[46] And, reflecting the British
preference for the nexus of air-ground operations to be at the Army-Group/ATAF level rather than at the
AFCENT/AAFCE level, OAS sorties were allocated to the ATAF commanders. Furthermore, because the ATAF had
responsibility for supporting an Army Group, the Army Group commander had significant influence in determining
how the OAS sorties were sub-allocated among the corps under his command. On the whole, the US Army was quite
satisfied with this arrangement. The OAS = BAI + CAS formulation gave the CENTAG commander (an American)
sufficient influence over air operations to conduct major land operations under the theater campaign plan. Furthermore,
this arrangement provided subordinate corps commanders access to an Army commander in the person of the
commander, CENTAG, to whom they could make their case for priority of both BAI and CAS sorties.[47] The USAF,
however, was much more ambivalent about BAI. While senior American airmen had been obliged by the constraints
of allied diplomacy to accept it as NATO doctrine, they were reluctant to incorporate into US doctrine any provisions
for ground commanders to influence air interdiction.
A long period of negotiation at the TAC-TRADOC and departmental levels culminated in a position paper on OAS in
May 1981.[48] In essence, this document constituted formal biservice cognizance of the NATO doctrine. It also
codified the previously agreed arrangement for an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) to be assigned to each corps
and it explicitly recognized that, "generally, only at corps level will sufficient information be available to determine
whether it is possible to engage and counter a threat with conventional organic firepower or whether it is necessary to
have this organic firepower supplemented by OAS."[49] In other words, the Army not only persuaded the Air Force to
subscribe to the NATO doctrine on BAI, it also extracted acceptance of the reality that the ATAF commander's critical
decision on the allocation of his OAS sorties between BAI and CAS would be dependent upon intelligence developed
at the corps level and passed through the Army Group to the ATAF. There were, however, two problems. First, the
position paper was just that--a statement of position; it was not doctrine. Second, the signature of the Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations did not remove underlying Air Force reservations about giving the
Army influence over any form of interdiction.[50]
In sum, between 1980 and 1986, the Army and the Air Force institutionalized the partnership that had been formed
from 1973 to 1979. This regularization was centered around the Army's development and refinement of its AirLand
Battle doctrine and was manifested in the series of J-manuals produced by the TAC/TRADOC relationship and in the
"31 Initiatives" at the department level. The Air Force also developed a more coherent statement of its basic doctrine.
And, although this doctrine did not take explicit cognizance of the operational level of war articulated in the 1982 and
1988 editions of FM 100-5, it at least demonstrated a preliminary vision for how air and ground forces might
cooperate at this level. There remained, however, divergences of perspective about the air-ground interface that were
apparently resolved by the interdepartmental position paper on Offensive Air Support, but which continued to boil
beneath the surface.
Cross Currents, 1987-1990
As the Army-Air Force partnership continued to mature (1987-1990), two developments--one in each service--

influenced the partnership in ways that were not immediately apparent. The first was the Army's development of a
detailed doctrine for the corps' conduct of deep battle; the second was the publication of a National Defense University
thesis entitled The Air Campaign, written by a then relatively obscure Air Force Colonel named John Warden.
The strength of the Army-Air Force partnership was evident in the continuation of a number of biservice projects. By
December 1987, TRADOC and TAC, operating under the aegis of the 31 Initiatives, developed a draft summary of
requirements for a follow-on to the A-10 as a CAS aircraft.[51] By 1988 the services had reached agreement on
concepts for joint attack of Soviet helicopters, the alignment of air liaison officers and forward air controllers with
Army maneuver units, and a follow-on to the J-SEAD manual of 1982. Further indication of the institutional solidarity
was evident in an article by General Robert D. Russ, who was General Wilbur L. Creech's successor at TAC, entitled
"The Air Force, the Army, and the Battlefield of the 1990s." Here Russ stated categorically, "Everything that tactical
air does directly supports Army operations."[52]
In 1987, the Army took another step forward in the maturity of its deep battle concept with the publication of a
handbook describing the capabilities of existing and developmental deep battle systems. The handbook outlined an
integrated group of Army and Air Force systems to sense enemy targets, process information about these targets,
communicate the information to appropriate agencies, and control the Army and Air Force weapons that would be
used to strike them. The Air Force's Precision Location Strike System (PLSS) and Joint Surveillance Target
Acquisition Reporting System (JSTARS) and the Army's Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) were particularly
important components of this system.[53] The pièce de résistance of deep battle publications was the 1990 handbook
"Corps Deep Operations (ATACMS, Aviation and Intelligence Support): Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures." This
work was exactly what its title implied, a handy how-to book for use by corps commanders and their principal
planners in sorting out the difficult coordination issues that would be involved in attacking second-echelon divisions of
a Soviet-style combined arms army. It was the product of six years of hard thinking that conceptually represented the
practical link between the technology developed to fight the deep battle and the overarching doctrine of AirLand
Battle.
However, by developing extended-range systems that allowed the corps commander to fight the deep battle, the Army
had raised the question of how the effects of these systems would be coordinated with air operations. The immediate
focus of this issue was the placement of and procedures surrounding the fire support coordination line (FSCL). The
FSCL, originally known as the "no-bomb line," was developed during World War II as a coordination measure to
reduce, if not eliminate, the chance that aircraft might drop ordnance on friendly troops. It was defined as a line short
of which the release of air weapons required the prior clearance of a ground commander, and it applied primarily to
aircrews returning from interdiction and armed reconnaissance missions with unexpended ordnance who wanted to be
able to take advantage of targets of opportunity without endangering friendly ground forces. The FSCL was normally
placed at the range limit of friendly artillery. As long as this range was in the neighborhood of 10-15 kilometers
beyond the friendly front lines, this placement did not present much of a problem, because air strikes within that range
would, perforce, be coordinated with ground forces. However, with the advent of the multiple-launch rocket system
and later ATACMS, the Army had weapons that could reach out to roughly 30 and 100 kilometers respectively.
Additionally, the corps deep attack manual envisioned Apache helicopter attacks to a depth of 70-100 kilometers
beyond the front lines. These newly developed capabilities placed the Army and the Air Force at loggerheads. If, on
the one hand, the FSCL was pushed out to the depths of new Army weapons, it would significantly interfere with Air
Force interdiction efforts and could potentially allow enemy forces to escape attack by friendly air formations. If, on
the other hand, the FSCL was kept relatively close to the friendly front lines, the corps commander would lose freedom
of action in the employment of his fire support assets if he was required to coordinate fires beyond the FSCL with the
Air Force prior to execution. This conundrum defied mutually satisfactory resolution.[54]
Another indicator of the potential fraying of the Army-Air Force partnership was the 1988 publication of John
Warden's The Air Campaign.[55] This book could be interpreted on two levels. At its most obvious, the book was an
intelligent and imaginative tract that took the basic logic of operational art--the linkage of strategic objectives and
tactical goals--and applied it to air warfare. As such, it addressed classic military questions such as the relationship
between offense and defense, the trade-offs between concentration and economy of force, the employment of
operational reserves, and the use of deception in war--all from an air perspective. In this sense, there was little
revolutionary about it. In another sense, however, it was an airpower manifesto in the tradition of Douhet, Mitchell,

and de Seversky. Although carefully qualified, there was a theme of airpower dominance that ran through the book like
a brightly colored thread. Chapter subheads such as "Single Arms Can Prevail," "War Can be Won from the Air," and
"Command Is True Center of Gravity" suggested an airpower-centered approach to warfare that had perhaps not fully
matured at the time of publication.
That soon changed. The pivotal question that The Air Campaign had not addressed was, "If airpower can be a warwinning instrument, how does it become one?" In the summer of 1988, Warden conceived of an answer to that
question.[56] Picturing an enemy society as a system, he reasoned that its ability to generate power depended on five
sub-systems which, in decreasing order of significance, were leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, population,
and fielded forces.[57] Warden represented these sub-systems as five concentric rings with leadership in the center and
fielded forces on the circumference. This formulation directly confronted a central concern of almost all airpower
thinkers: what to target. To Warden the answer was clear: start at the inside and work out. Had it not been for the
pivotal role that Warden played in the early planning for air operations in the Gulf War, The Air Campaign and
Warden's subsequent musings on targeting philosophies would not have been of much more than academic interest.[58]
Even at the time, however, it did represent a view in the Air Force that the application of airpower could, and perhaps
even should, be thought of as being independent of ground operations. To this extent, it constituted another crosscurrent in the story of the Army-Air Force partnership
Conclusions
This article has examined two issues: the areas of convergence and divergence between Army and Air Force
perspectives on air-ground operations between the end of the Vietnam War and the eve of Desert Shield and the
underlying causes for them. It is clear that there was a great deal about which the services agreed. They agreed on the
importance of CAS, that it was an Air Force mission, and that there should be a dedicated CAS platform and,
therewith, a dedicated group of pilots whose sole training focus would be their ability to execute the CAS mission.
They agreed on the importance of suppressing enemy air defenses, the fact that it was a shared responsibility, and the
detailed procedures required to carry it out. They agreed on the importance of attacking enemy second-echelon forces,
that Army helicopters and Air Force platforms could work in close cooperation to accomplish this mission, and the
detailed tactical procedures such cooperation required. They disagreed over two issues: the amount of influence that
senior ground commanders should have over Air Force interdiction operations, and the mechanisms for coordinating
the effects of fixed-wing air and extended-range Army systems. At the risk of being somewhat simplistic, one can
conclude that while at the tactical level there was very significant agreement, at the operational level there was
noticeable divergence.
The dynamics behind these similarities and differences of perspective were the product of the centripetal forces that
tended to pull the Army and the Air Force together and the centrifugal forces that tended to pull them apart.
The relative cohesion and strength of the Army-Air Force partnership from 1973 to 1990 can be attributed in rough
priority to:
the unifying effect of the NATO defense mission;
the close cooperation of personalities at or near the top of each service;
a leadership shift in the Air Force that put fighter rather than bomber pilots in the majority of influential
positions; and
the clarity of the Army's vision of how it intended to fight a future war that tended to pull the Air Force in its
wake.
The NATO defense mission gave each service a clear and unifying mission. The ability to defeat a Warsaw Pact
invasion of Western Europe below the nuclear threshold was, for the period under analysis, the single most significant
criterion of operational effectiveness for both services. When the Army and the Air Force looked at this challenge,
each realized it needed the other. While it was true that the Army dependence on the Air Force was greater than vice
versa, it could not be denied that to suppress hostile air defenses, the Air Force needed Army help. Furthermore, in
order to make manifest its contribution to the national defense, the Air Force had to demonstrate its ability to destroy
Soviet tanks as well as Soviet MiGs.

The close personal relations established between senior Army and Air Force leaders were vital to the strength of the
partnership, helping to forge a bond in peace that one hoped would withstand the rigors of war.[59] These relationships
were abetted by a gradual but distinct change in Air Force leadership. In 1960, bomber pilots held 77 percent of the
top Air Force leadership positions, fighter pilots, 11 percent; by 1990 these percentages had become 18 and 53 percent
respectively.[60] This shift seems to have been driven at least in part by the more prominent role of fighter pilots in the
Vietnam War and the declining numbers of bombers in the inventory. While there are complications in the analysis,
the trend is clear; and it is legitimate to suspect that the Air Force fighter community was slightly more favorably
disposed to welcome the Army's doctrinal advances than was the bomber community.
The final factor pulling the Army and the Air Force together was the Army's clear vision of how it wanted to fight a
future war and its distinct realization that Air Force support was absolutely essential for victory. Air Force centrality to
the Army's view of tactics was integral to both the Active Defense and the AirLand Battle doctrines; the Army's
articulation of the operational level of war in the latter also contained an explicit acknowledgment of the importance of
coordinated air support. In something of a doctrinal muddle for several years after Vietnam, the Air Force appeared to
follow the Army's lead.
There was, however, also a set of forces that tended to pull the services in opposite directions. These included:
the operational differences between the media in which they fight;
the cultural implications these differences engender;
varying institutional structures for doctrinal formulation; and
the capabilities of emerging technology.
Air and land forces fight in two distinctly dissimilar environments. The former enjoy the flexibility to focus their
effects at different loci depending on the strategic, operational, and tactical dictates of the moment, but their presence
is relatively transitory. The latter offer the offsetting advantage of much more permanent effects, but their flexibility is
limited by gravity. These diverging operating characteristics produce cultural approaches to war that maximize the
inherent strengths of each force, i.e., flexibility and permanence.
Beyond these endemic difficulties of developing common doctrine, the Army's 1973 decision to create a major
subordinate command dedicated to the formulation and promulgation of doctrine and the Air Force's choice not to
create such a command made it difficult for the two services to develop common doctrinal framework. Finally, the
technological evolution that extended the ranges of land-based indirect fire systems and armed helicopters blurred the
line between what had been the relatively exclusive operational domains of the two services, thus creating new
doctrinal challenges that defied easy solution.
Interestingly, the partnership between the two services appeared to be independent of two factors that frequently play a
role in interservice relationships: the size of the defense budget and external pressure for cooperation. The partnership
began in the mid-1970s when the defense budget was falling steadily in the aftermath of Vietnam, and it continued to
prosper throughout the 1980s when the defense budget was robust. It is also clear that the partnership was not foisted
on the services by outside pressure for greater joint cooperation. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986 was passed well after the TAC-TRADOC dialogue had matured into a full partnership and after the 31
Initiatives had been officially formulated. Furthermore the key joint publication, Doctrine for Joint Operations, which
flowed from the Goldwater-Nichols Act's specific recognition of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the
promulgator of joint doctrine, was still in draft form in 1990.[61] The drive for "jointness" therefore had virtually no
effect on the cooperation that was established between the two services during the period of this study. While it could
be argued that an earlier start on joint doctrine might have settled the unresolved issues between the Army and the Air
Force prior to 1990, the extent to which joint doctrine can compensate for a lack of internally generated interservice
cooperation remains to be demonstrated.
From 1973 to 1990, the Army and the Air Force formed a solid partnership centered around the Army's ability to
execute its AirLand Battle doctrine with Air Force support. The strength of this partnership was evident in extensive
biservice training, doctrinal publications, and programmatic cooperation. There was, however, an underlying tension
that can be primarily attributed to diverging perspectives between the two services about the modalities of air-ground

cooperation at the operational level of war. Had war broken out in Western Europe, it is arguable that the strengths of
the partnership would have been much more apparent than its weaknesses. The tension in the partnership nevertheless
became rather more apparent in the weeks and months after Saddam Hussein's tanks rolled into Kuwait, triggering the
American-led coalition's responses of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In this theater, the Army-Air Force partnership
was severely strained; and the performance resembled neither a delicately balanced chamber session nor a finely tuned
symphony, but a concerto in which each performer believed he was playing the featured instrument. Here, the mutual
listening skills were exiguous, and the interaction between the two services at times resembled a dialogue of the
deaf.[62] But that is another story.
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